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This article examines the relationship between national courts and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) based on a legal-empirical research consisting of 
interviews and a legal analysis of judgments. It empirically tests which factors shape 
(i) Dutch national courts' motivations to refer a case to the CJEU, (ii) how the 
CJEU's preliminary rulings are received and implemented by national courts, and 
(iii) the extent to which the reception of the CJEU's preliminary ruling influences the 
national courts' future decision to refer. This argument is presented through a case 
study in the field of migration law in the Netherlands (2013-2016). This article shows 
that earlier theories about judicial empowerment and bureaucratic politics, 
emphasising politico-strategic reasons for (non)referral, have a limited explanatory 
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value in the context of migration. It is so despite the expectation that strategic reasons 
are particularly applicable in a highly Europeanised, judicialised and politicised field 
such as migration law. Judges primarily operate pragmatically when deciding to refer 
(or not) and when applying the requested CJEU judgments. Even though several 
national judges expressed criticism about the CJEU and some of its judgments, this 
has not affected them to such an extent that they felt discouraged from referring future 
cases or were reluctant to follow-up on CJEU judgments. 
Keywords: preliminary ruling procedure; judicial dialogue; national courts; 
motives to refer; judicial empowerment; follow-up to CJEU judgments 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The EU has had a tremendous impact on national law and politics. One of the 
most important drivers of the European integration project has been the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU has been able to 
have such an impact only as a result of the cooperation of national courts and 
their references about the interpretation and the validity of EU law.1 There 
are, however, growing indications that the referral procedure, which is the 
'keystone' of the EU legal system,2 is not working optimally. National court 
judges seem to lack the necessary knowledge of EU law or they simply appear 
unwilling to refer.3 Prechal, the current judge from the Netherlands at the 
CJEU, for example held that 'the quality and capacity of the national courts 
to apply [EU] law and to do so correctly is a matter for serious concern. [...] 
national judges, even the 'younger' generation, are rather still struggling with 
                                                 
1 Karen J Alter, Establishing the supremacy of European Law. The Making of an 
international rule of law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2001) 320; George 
Tridimas, Takis Tridimas, 'National courts and the European Court of Justice: a 
public choice analysis of the preliminary reference procedure' (2004) International 
Review of Law and Economics 1215. 
2 The power of national courts to make a reference 'constitutes the very essence of the 
[Union] system of judicial protection'. Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para. 176; Case 
C-300/99 P Area Cova EU:C:2001:71, para. 54. 
3 Michal Bobek, 'Of feasibility and silent elephants: The legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice through the eyes of national courts' in Maurice Adams et al (eds), Judging 
Europe's judges: the legitimacy of the European Court of Justice Examined (Hart 2013) 197, 
212-213; 'Wallis report. Report on the role of the national judge in the European 
judicial system', 2007/2027(INI), 4 June 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2008-
0224+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed 31 July 2018. 
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[EU] law than smoothly applying it'.4 The actual implementation of the 
consequent CJEU rulings is also far from ideal, because judgments sometimes 
only contain a limited number of arguments or lack a clear answer.5 Hence, 
many important principles developed by the CJEU have simply remained 
unimplemented.6 In addition, several constitutional and supreme courts have 
openly rebelled against or showed their criticism about the CJEU. The recent 
years were marked by some high-profile cases, including the Danish Ajos case, 
the Italian Taricco saga as well as the German Gauweiler episode, that brought 
some of these problematic features of the procedure to the surface.7 
The question is whether these often anecdotal allegations about the 
improper functioning of the preliminary reference procedure are real. Are 
these three high profile cases merely the tip of the iceberg or the exceptions 
that prove the rule that the preliminary ruling procedure is generally working 
well? In other words, is the surge in integration-sceptical national judgments 
representative of the relationship between national courts and the CJEU or 
is there a silent majority of integration-friendly courts? If the procedure 
indeed functions sub-optimally this is crucial to know. Certainly, it would 
mean that the effectiveness of EU law could be affected if these shortcomings 
                                                 
4 Sacha Prechal, 'National courts in EU judicial structures' (2006) 25 Yearbook of 
European Law 429, 432-433. 
5 Anthony Arnull, 'Judicial dialogue in the European Union', in Julie Dickson, Pavlos 
Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical foundations of EU law (OUP 2012) 109, 129; Marc de 
Werd, 'Dynamics at play in the EU preliminary ruling procedure' 22 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative law (2015) 149, 152; Eleanor Sharpston, 
'Making the Court of Justice of the European Union more productive' (2014) 21 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative law 763. 
6 Gareth Davies, 'Activism relocated. The self-restraint of the European Court of 
Justice in its national context' (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 76; 
Thomas de la Mare, Catherine Donnelly, 'Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal 
Integration: Evolution and Stasis' in Paul Craig, Grianne de Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2011) 363; Takis Tridimas, 'Constitutional review of 
Member State action: the virtues and vices of an incomplete jurisdiction' (2011) 9 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 737. 
7 Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri EU:C:2016:278; Case C-105/14 Taricco EU:C:2015:555; 
Case C-62/14 Gauweiler EU:C:2015:400; Oliver Garner, 'The borders of European 
integration on trial in the Member States: Dansk Industri, Miller, and Taricco' (2017) 
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were not addressed. When national courts are frequently confronted with a 
deficient 'dialogue'8 or unsatisfactory answers from the CJEU, this might 
discourage them to refer in future. Why would a judge refer when he or she 
considers the interaction with the CJEU, in the words of a Spanish judge, 'a 
monologue'?9 The President of the Danish Supreme Court pointed to 
another dysfunctional element in the relationship between the European 
Court of Justice and the national courts:: 'If the interpretation of the 
European Court of Justice is taking national courts by surprise, one may fear 
a growing unwillingness of national courts and parties to a legal conflict to 
present matters before the Court of Justice'.10 Omissions to refer could mean 
that breaches of EU law remain unaddressed. This could in turn have severe 
implications for the judicial protection of individuals, and most certainly for 
individuals who are in vulnerable positions such as asylum seekers.11 This is 
not to say, however, that more references are necessarily a good thing. 
Indeed, the average time taken by the CJEU to deal with references could 
also have negative consequences for the parties and justice objectives in 
general. 
Given the identified problems, it is crucial to understand, firstly, why and 
how national courts use the preliminary ruling procedure and engage with the 
CJEU. More specifically, what are judges' (individual) motives to refer or not 
to refer (section III)? Secondly, how are the requested CJEU's rulings 
received and implemented by national courts (section IV)? Answers to these 
questions, which are also depicted in figure 1, enable the third question to be 
                                                 
8 The author deliberately aims to avoid the rather normative term 'dialogue' and 
prefers using the more neutral term 'interaction'. As will be outlined in section IV.3, 
judges often do not experience their interaction with the CJEU as being a dialogue. 
9 Mario García, 'Cautious Openness: the Spanish Constitutional Court's approach to 
EU law in recent national case law', European Law Blog, 7 June 2017, 
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/06/07/cautious-openness-the-spanish-
constitutional-courts-approach-to-eu-law-in-recent-national-case-law/, last 
accessed 31 July 2018.  
10 Ulla Neergaard, Karsten E. Sørensen, 'Activist infighting among courts and 
breakdown of mutual trust? The Danish Supreme Court, the CJEU, and the Ajos 
case' (2017) Yearbook of European Law 275, 312. 
11 Takis Tridimas, 'Knocking on heaven's door: Fragmentation, efficiency and defiance 
in the preliminary reference procedure' (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9. 
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addressed. This third question relates to whether there is a feedback 
relationship between the national judges' perception of their interaction with 
the CJEU and the national court judges' willingness to refer cases in future 
(section IV). This article answers these questions on the basis of a case study 
on the practice of referral in the field of migration in the Netherlands (see 
section II.2 for a justification of this selection). These questions are not only 
relevant from a practical point of view, but also from an academic perspective 
since so far they have not received much attention in the literature (see 
section II.1). 
The results of this research suggest that there is no need to worry about the 
functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure. The main reason for this 
optimistic conclusion is that judges primarily operate 'pragmatically' when 
deciding to refer (or not) and when applying the requested CJEU judgments. 
Even though several judges expressed criticism as to the CJEU and some 
CJEU judgments, this has not affected them to such an extent that they were 
reluctant to follow-up on CJEU judgments or felt discouraged from referring 
future cases. Another important contribution of this article is that it casts 
doubt upon the explanatory power of theoretical accounts that portray 
national courts as strategic actors that primarily refer for 'political' strategic 
reasons. Above all, judges consider pragmatic reasons, including practical 
considerations related to the consequences of referring in terms of delays or 
the importance of the issue at stake. Before turning to these findings, the 
article firstly gives a literature review, a justification of the selection of 
migration in the Netherlands as case study and an outline of the methodology 
(section II.3). 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Literature Review 
With respect to the first question, the motives to refer, the literature to date 
has primarily consisted of quantitative studies using econometric models. In 
addition, those studies primarily tested structural factors at the Member State 
level in order to explain why courts in some Member States refer more than 
courts in other Member States. Such factors include the level of GDP, the 
willingness to litigate, support for European integration, presence of judicial 
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review and the monist or dualist nature of the legal system.12 Despite ample 
research, these findings on their own are not wholly satisfactory, since 
different and sometimes conflicting factors have been identified and because 
differences within Member States and across time have often been 
overlooked.13 Rather than examining these aggregate-level factors, this article 
looks into the motives of individual judges as a way to fill the gaps in earlier 
research. In doing so, it aims to contribute to a growing literature on the 
factors and motives shaping the willingness of courts and judges to refer.14 
One could basically distinguish two types of theoretical perspectives on the 
motives of judges (not) to refer: politico-strategic reasons and other non-
strategic reasons, which are operationalised in Tables 1 and 2. 
A. Politico-strategic Considerations to (not) Refer 
There are three dominant perspectives in the Europeanisation literature on 
national courts' motives to refer. Firstly, based on neo-functionalist theories 
on European integration, the judicial empowerment hypothesis posits that 
national courts refer to compel the government to change its laws when they 
                                                 
12 Stacy A. Nyikos, 'The preliminary reference process. National court 
implementation, changing opportunity structures and litigant desistment' (2003) 4 
European Union Politics 397; Marlene Wind, Dorte S. Martinsen, Gabriel P. Rotger, 
'The uneven legal push for Europe: Questioning variation when national courts go to 
Europe' (2009) 10 European Union Politics 63. 
13 For a good discussion of these differences, see Arthur Dyevre, Nicolas Lampach, 
'The Choice for Europe: Judicial Behaviour and Legal Integration in the European 
Union' (2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926496, last 
accessed 31 July 2018, 3-4. 
14 Such individual motives have not received much attention (yet). There have been 
studies on Poland, Denmark and Sweden and (recently) Italy, Germany and France. 
See for example, Marlene Wind, 'The Nordics, the EU and the reluctance towards 
supranational judicial review' (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 1039; 
Urszula Jaremba, 'Polish civil judiciary vis-à-vis the preliminary ruling procedure: in 
search of a mid-range theory' in Bruno de Witte et al (eds), National courts and EU 
law. New issues, theories and methods (Edward Elgar 2016) 49; Tommaso Pavone, 
'Revisiting judicial empowerment in the European Union: Limits of empowerment, 
logics of resistance' (2018) Journal of Law and Courts, pages yet unknown. 
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are of the opinion that a national measure violates EU law.15 Referring is 
hence used as a 'sword' vis-à-vis the legislator or executive. Asking for a 
preliminary ruling would increase the chance of government compliance.16 
Secondly, based on neo-realist or intergovernmentalist theories, the 
sustained resistance view, takes the opposite stance and argues that national 
courts have a strong incentive to 'shield' national legislation from the CJEU 
by withholding references because of national interest considerations. They 
prefer to 'shield' national policy and legislation from undesirable influence of 
the CJEU, especially in politically sensitive cases.17 This preference could 
stem from the national court's loyalty towards the executive, its resistance 
against the dynamic interpretation by the CJEU, the pressure from the public 
or other domestic political considerations.18 Thirdly, the bureaucratic 
politics model developed by Alter implies that EU law is used in bureaucratic 
struggles between different levels within the judiciary.19 This model explains 
why different national courts have their own (different) incentives to refer 
and why there is divergence in the number of references among lower and 
higher courts within and between Member States. It also points out that 
lower courts use the preliminary reference procedure to 'leapfrog' the 
national judicial hierarchy in order to seek support from the CJEU as 
protection against reversal of their decisions by a higher court or the 
government.20 This theory spells out why most of the references are made by 
lower courts in the majority of EU Member States, albeit not in the 
                                                 
15 Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'A Quiet revolution: The European Court of Justice and its 
interlocutors' (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 510, 523; Jonathan Golub, 'The 
politics of judicial discretion: Rethinking the interaction between national courts 
and the European Court of Justice' (1996) 19 West European Politics 360, 379; 
Davies (n 6) 85; Alter (n 1) 219 and 228. 
16 Andreas J Obermaier, 'The national judiciary. Sword of European Court of Justice 
rulings: the example of the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence' (2008) European Law Journal 
735; Tridimas & Tridimas (n 1) 1215. 
17 Golub (n 15) 375-379; Wind et al (n 12) 63. 
18 Wind et al (n 12) 75-76; Wind (n 14) 1053; Golub (n 15) 377; Karen J. Alter, 'Explaining 
national court acceptance of European Court jurisprudence: A critical evaluation of 
theories of legal integration', in: Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone-Sweet, Jospeph 
H. Weiler (ed.), The European Courts and National Courts (Hart 1998) 225, 236. 
19 Alter (n 18) 241-247. 
20 Alter (n 18) 242. 
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Netherlands.21 Note, however, that recent studies suggest that the highest 
courts in other EU Member States have in recent years 'reconquered' control 
from the lowest courts over the application of EU law and references to the 
CJEU.22 
Table 1: operationalisation of strategic reasons to refer 
Motivations 
(not) to refer Theory Proxy 
Political/ strategic 
considerations 
(section III.1) 
Sword 
Strike down national law or policy; 
considerable financial consequences 
Shield 
Protect national legislation from EU 
law 
Leapfrog Challenge (another) higher court 
B. Non-strategic Reasons to (not) Refer 
These three politico-strategic perspectives have for a long time dominated 
the research on the interaction between national courts and the CJEU. The 
recent literature, however, have not found much support for the theories 
construing courts as politico-strategic actors. Several authors highlighted the 
increasing reluctance of lower courts to refer, coupled with a greater usage of 
the reference procedure by the highest courts in recent years across the EU. 
In doing so, they showed that earlier accounts which emphasise the 
important share of lower courts' references in the case docket of the CJEU 
are no longer telling the full story.23 Instead of primarily strategic reasons, 
                                                 
21 In the Netherlands 66% of the references have been made by the highest courts 
while in 11 Member States, including Belgium, France, Spain and the UK, more than 
70% of the references have been made by lower courts. Chantal Mak, Elaine Mak, 
Vanessa Mak, 'De verwijzende rechter. Rechtspolitieke verandering via prejudiciële 
vragen van lagere rechters aan het Europese Hof van Justitie' [The referring judge. 
Legal political change via preliminary references of lower courts to the CJEU] (2017) 
Nederlands Juristenblad 1724. 
22 Since the situation in most EU Member States currently reflects the practice in the 
Netherlands, this point does not seem very relevant to consider in relation to the 
country selection. Daniel R. Kelemen, Tommaso Pavone, 'The European Court of 
Justice's evolving relationship with national judiciaries' (2017), unpublished. 
23 Francisco P. Coutinho, 'European Union law in Portuguese courts: An appraisal of 
the first twenty-five years after accession' (2017) Yearbook of Eurpean Law 358; 
Arthur Dyevre, Angelina Atanasova, Monika Glavina, 'Who asks most? Institutional 
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Pavone concluded, based on a thorough empirical research on Italy, Germany 
and France, that (a lack of) references can be explained by path-dependent, 
every-day practices within national courts.24 
While the literature has focused on strategic reasons for courts to refer, it has 
not yet formulated hypotheses about the possible non-strategic reasons for 
the courts to do so. Against this backgroung, five mechanisms can be distilled 
from existing theoretical and empirical accounts. Firstly, legal-formalist or 
'compliance pull' motives based on the 'power of the law'.25 National courts 
refer because they feel responsible for a correct application of EU law or, in 
the case of the highest court, they consider themselves obliged to refer.26 The 
highest courts are required to refer when they have doubts about the 
interpretation and validity of EU law unless it would 'in no way affect the 
outcome of the case'.27 This being said, there are two other exceptions for the 
highest courts to refer, which are commonly referred to as Cilfit-exceptions: 
no reference is necessary when the CJEU has 'already dealt with the point of 
law in question' (acte éclairé) or when 'the correct application of [EU] law may 
be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner 
in which the question raised is to be resolved' (acte clair).28 Secondly, 
pragmatic considerations other than strict legal obligations to refer also play 
an important role.29 This includes, for example, case specific reasons which 
relate to the importance of the questions concerned or efficiency reasons 
                                                 
incentives and referral activity in European Union legal order' (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051659, last accessed 31 July 
2018; Kelemen & Pavone (n 22). 
24 Pavone (n 14); Compare also with Jaremba (n 14) 49; Denise C. Hübner, 'The 
decentralized enforcement of European law: national court decisions on EU 
directives with and without preliminary reference submissions' (2017) Journal of 
European Public Policy 1. 
25 Weiler (n 15) 520; see recently Hübner (n 24). 
26 Alter (n 1) 230. 
27 Case 283/81 Cilfit EU:C:1982:335, para. 10. 
28 Ibid, para.14 and 16. 
29 See more generally about 'pragmatic adjudication' Richard Posner, How judges think 
(CUP 2008); Urszula Jaremba, Polish Civil Judges as European Union Law Judges: 
Knowledge, Experiences and Attitudes (2012), https://repub.eur.nl/pub/37318/, last 
accessed 31 July 2018, 352.  
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concerning the consequences of referring in terms of the delay in the specific 
case or other cases involving the same EU law issue.30 Thirdly, personal and 
psychological factors related to the individual judge have been mentioned as 
well. This includes, for example, the limited knowledge about EU law and/or 
the preliminary ruling procedure as a reason for non-referral.31 It has also been 
noted that some judges might be reluctant to refer, because they are afraid 
that they ask a wrong question and that the CJEU declares their question 
inadmissible.32 Fourthly, institutional and organisational factors related to 
the institutional dynamics of a particular court have also been put forward. 
These factors include, for example, the need to meet 'production targets' 
which discourages references to the CJEU.33 Fifthly, the literature has also 
noted that the parties and their requests to refer can influence the courts 
willingness to refer.34 
Table 2: operationalisation of non-strategic reasons to refer 
Motivations 
(not) to refer Theory Proxy 
Non-strategic 
considerations 
(section III.2) 
Compliance 
pull/ 
legal 
formalism 
The need to comply with the 
obligation to refer/ correct application 
of the Cilfit doctrine 
                                                 
30 Judges primarily refer because this is simply necessary for them to solve the national 
dispute efficiently. If they are not able to interpret EU law on their own, the CJEU 
might provide the required clarity. Hans-W. Micklitz, The politics of judicial 
cooperation in the EU. Sunday trading, equal treatment and good faith (CUP 2005) 437; 
Jaremba (n 14) 67. 
31 Jaremba (n 29); Tobias Nowak et al, National judges as European Union judges: 
Knowledge, experiences and attitudes of lower court judges in Germany and the Netherlands 
(Eleven 2011) 49. 
32 Jaremba (n 29) 229-230; Hanna Sevenster, Corinna Wissels, 'Laveren tussen Ferreira 
en Van Dijk' [Plying between Ferreira en Van Dijk] in M. Bosma et al (eds), Graag nog 
even bespreken. Liber amirocum Henk Lubberdink (Raad van State 2016) 83, 90; Kees 
Groenendijk, 'Waarom rechters niet naar Luxemburg gaan: politieke structuur of 
rechtscultuur?' [Why judges do not go to Luxembourg: political structure or legal 
culture?] in R. Baas et al (eds), Rechtspleging en rechtsbescherming. Liber amicorum voor 
prof. dr. Leny E. de Groot-van Leeuwen (Kluwer 2015) 302. 
33 Groenendijk (n 33); Nowak et al (n 31) 54. 
34 Wind (n 14) 1053; Wind et al (n 12) 283. 
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Pragmatism 
Need of legal clarity; answer perceived 
necessary to resolve the case 
Reasonable reading of Cilfit 
Natural reluctance (e.g. decide 
themselves) 
Importance of the question 
Consequences of referring for the 
parties 
Efficiency reasons (delay in case, and 
other cases) 
Resources necessary to write question, 
time 
Personal/ 
psychological  
Position in the career 
Background/ expertise 
Knowledge of EU law procedure 
Self-perception: e.g. lower courts as 
fact finders 
Fear to ask (wrong) questions 
Satisfaction of writing a reference/ 
contributing to EU law 
Institutional 
Awareness (e.g. specialised EU law 
committees in courts) 
Case management (backlog of cases) 
Request of the 
parties 
Parties requested referral 
 
So far, strategic and non-strategic reasons have not been tested in the field of 
migration. The findings presented in this article further corroborate recent 
studies, such as Pavone's, and challenge some major assumptions of the 
dominant theoretical approaches, namely that politico-strategic reasons 
alone do not explain the motivation of national judges to refer. In addition, it 
shows that the influence of parties on national judges' decision to refer is 
rather limited. 
C. Follow-up 
There is not much research on the second question dealing with the follow-
up to CJEU judgments, except for some older studies finding high rates of 
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implementation.35 Bobek observed that 'very little or nothing at all is known 
[...] whether or not national courts are satisfied with the Court's decision(s) 
once they receive them, whether they consider them authoritative, and 
whether the Court's case law is in fact followed'.36 There is an assumption that 
preliminary rulings of the CJEU are implemented by the requesting national 
courts, but there is little systematic evidence supporting that view.37 While 
some older studies found high implementation rates,38 others noted that 
implementation is not always achieved or straightforward.39 Other outcomes 
than full application of the CJEU judgment include: partial application, a 
reinterpretation of the facts so that the CJEU judgment does not apply, re-
referral to the CJEU and concealed or open non-compliance.40  
This article will thus fill an empirical gap and provide reflection on the 
current discourse which tends to overemphasise integration-sceptical 
national judgments.41 It shows that Dutch judges have generally adopted a 
positive attitude towards the CJEU and its judgments. It will also be argued 
                                                 
35 An implementation rate of 90% was found for the Netherlands in the period 1961-
1985. Nyikos likewise found an 'extremely high' rate of 96%. Joest Korte (ed), 
'Primus inter pares: The European Court and national courts. The follow-up by 
national courts of preliminary rulings ex Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome: A report on 
the situation in the Netherlands' (1990) EUI Law Working Paper; Nyikos (n 12) 410; 
see also Arjen W.H. Meij, Prejudiciële vragen van Nederlandse rechters en hun gevolgen 
[Preliminary references of Dutch judges and their consequences] (W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink 1993); G. Wils, Prejudiciële vragen van Belgische rechters en hun gevolgen 
[Preliminary references of Belgian judges and their consequences] (W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink 1993).  
36 Bobek (n 3) 197. 
37 Nyikos (n 12) 398. 
38 Korte found an implementation rate for Dutch references (1961-1985) of 90%. Korte 
(n 35). Nyikos also found an 'extremely high' implementation rate of 96%. Nyikos (n 
12) 410. 89% of the respondents in a 2007 survey found the CJEU judgment readily 
applicable. Wallis report (n 3) 23. 
39 Davies (n 6) 81 and 89; Alter (n 18) 233-234; See, for example, the way in which the 
Danish Supreme Court was unwilling to change its ruling after Ajos. Neergaard & 
Sørensen (n 10). 
40 Nyikos (n 12) 399-401. 
41 Andreas Hofmann, 'Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union' 
(2018) International Journal of Law in Context 258. 
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that national judges' personal background and institutional position play an 
important role in their perception of the CJEU's case law. 
D. Feedback Loops 
Even less research has been conducted on the relationship between the 
motives of judges to (not) refer and their perception of the CJEU and CJEU 
judgments. It is difficult to clearly connect the idea of feedback loops to 
specific theoretical accounts or previous empirical studies. The notion of 
feedback loops relates, however, to a certain extent to Mayoral's notion of 
'trust', which he defines as 'national judges' belief about whether the CJEU 
will follow an expected course of action under conditions of uncertainty'.42 
The limited (theoretical) attention warrants further work in this direction. It 
also explains the more inductive and explorative approach that this study 
takes with respect to this third question (see further section II.3.C). 
2. References in Migration Law in the Netherlands (2013-2016) as a Case Study 
Given the shaky empirical support for the theories which portray courts as 
strategic actors, it is best to select an area of case law where one would expect 
these theories to apply. The field of asylum, migration and integration, one 
of the most contested issues that the EU is confronted with nowadays, lends 
itself to 'test' those theories. This is so because the aforementioned area has 
been greatly Europeanised in a relatively short period of time. It is also highly 
judicialised and politicised because many EU Member States, including the 
Netherlands, have adopted restrictive policies in this area, often testing and 
sometimes transcending the limits of EU law. It is not only the legislator 
which has become more restrictive in this field, but also some (highest) 
courts, such as the Dutch Council of State.43 This has led to increasing 
                                                 
42 Juan A. Mayoral, 'In the CJEU judges trust: A new approach in the judicial 
construction of Europe' (2017) Journal of Common Market Studies 551. 
43 The Salah Sheekh judgment of the ECtHR as an illustration of the restrictive 
approach of the Council of State. In this judgment, the ECtHR dismissed the Dutch 
government's plea of inadmissibility for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies even 
though the applicant had not lodged appeal with the Council. The ECtHR justified 
this by ruling that the Council 'may in theory have been capable of reversing the 
decision of the Regional Court, in practice a further appeal would have had virtually 
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litigation at both the national and European level, offering room for courts to 
challenge (or 'shield') national legislation or the restrictive approach of other 
courts.44 Courts are generally reluctant to strike down democratically 
adopted rules, especially in such a controversial and politically sensitive field 
as migration. Referring to the CJEU could give national courts an 
authoritative cover to do so. 
In addition, the Netherlands is also a suitable Member State to test these 
theories. Dutch courts have been 'integration friendly', they generally ask a 
high number of questions and are eager to engage with EU law.45 Dutch 
courts are also at the forefront in the field of migration. The Council of State 
was, for example, the first national court in the EU to ask questions about the 
Qualification Directive 2004/83, the Family Reunification Directive 
2003/86, as well as the Directive 2003/109 on third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents.46  
Table 3: Overview relevant cases studied for the period 2013-2016 
References by the highest courts References by lower courts (Rb.) 
C-601/15, PPU, J.N. (ABRvS) C-550/16, A. and S.  
C-133/15, Chavez-Vilchez (CRvB) C-331/16, K.  
C-153/14, K. and A. (ABRvS) C-18/16, K. 
C-579/13, P. and S. (CRvB) C-63/15, Ghezelbash  
C-554/13, Zh. and O. (ABRvS) C-158/13, Rajaby  
C-383/13 PPU, G. and R. (ABRvS)  
                                                 
no prospect of success.' ECtHR nr. 1948/04 Salah Sheekh, CE:ECHR: 
2007:0111JUD000194804, para. 123. 
44 Möritz Baumgärtel, 'Part of the game': government strategies against European 
litigation concerning migrant rights', in Tanja Gammeltoft-Hansen & Thomas 
Aalberts (eds), The Changing Practices of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2018), forthcoming. 
45 Bobek (n 3) 213. 
46 Respectively C-465/07 Elgafaji EU:C:2009:94 (Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ 
L304/12); C-578/08 Chakroun EU:C:2010:117 (Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12); C-502/10, 
Singh EU:C:2012:636 (Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] 
OJ L16/44). 
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C-171/13, Demirci (CRvB)  
C-148/13-150/13, A., B., C. (ABRvS)  
 
For this article all referred cases and decisions not to refer in the four-year 
period (2013-2016) were selected. 47 As Table 3 shows, thirteen cases have 
been referred to the CJEU in this period. Five references came from lower 
courts (rechtbank or Rb.) who are not obliged to refer on the basis of Article 
267 TFEU.48 Eight cases were referred by the two highest administrative 
courts which are active in this area: the Administrative Division of the Council 
of State (the Council of State or ABRvS) and the Central Appeals Tribunal (the 
Tribunal or CRvB). There had only been sixteen references in the thirteen 
years before (2000-2012), which illustrates the increasing Europeanisation in 
this area. The Europeanisation might of itself also be a factor that has 
contributed to the growing number of references. There are simply more EU 
(asylum and migration) rules, as well as more cross-border movements giving 
rise to more disputes and hence more case law of the CJEU. Lawyers have also 
become more specialised in EU (migration) law and, hence, increasingly 
appeal to EU law and request a reference to be made. There is also a 
reinforcing effect in the sense that once the CJEU has ruled on an issue, this 
almost unavoidably leads to new questions. One good example is the 
Zambrano ruling which has caused courts to ask new questions regarding the 
rights of residence of third country nationals with minor children who are EU 
citizens.49  
This article will not engage in a systematic comparison of migration with 
other fields of law. It will, nonetheless, provide some reflections on the 
                                                 
47 It was decided to focus on the most recent references that reflect the current 
operation of the procedure and dynamic between courts. The analysis included only 
references before 31 December 2016 in order to be able to study most, albeit not all, 
CJEU judgments and the national follow-up. This is so because it usually takes 15 
months before the CJEU answers the reference and often at least half a year before 
the referring court decides the dispute. The limited period does not mean that older 
or more recent cases and developments are excluded, especially when they were 
mentioned during interviews or in the literature, but simply that no structured 
database search was conducted for this period. 
48 Unless they have doubts about the validity of EU law. Case 314/85 Foto-Frost 
EU:C:1987:452, paras. 15 and 16; E.g. NL:RBDHA:2016:265, para. 8.2. 
49 Case C-34/09 Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. 
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specific nature of the legal field of migration in comparison with other fields 
based on some provisional findings from a broader 4.5 years research project 
on the interaction between the CJEU and Dutch, Irish and British courts.50 
These provisional findings suggest that the field of law is an important factor 
affecting especially the national judges' motives to refer.51 
3. Research Design and Methodology  
This article will address the three research questions presented in the 
introduction on the basis of a legal-empirical research combining legal 
analysis and interviews (see figure 1). A doctrinal legal analysis alone is 
insufficient to answer the three questions. While previous studies primarily 
relied on interviews and or surveys with judges, this article combines 
interviews with a comprehensive and structured analysis of judgments of 
both national courts and the CJEU.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 In order to obtain a good insight in judicial motives, this project considers Member 
States with a different practice of referring by looking at the relative number of 
references per 1 million inhabitants. UK courts make relatively little use of the 
preliminary reference procedure. By contrast, Dutch courts ask a high number of 
questions and are eager to engage with EU law. Ireland is somewhere in between. 
Complementary to this project, a PhD researcher (Jesse Claassen) is conducting a 
similar research project on Austria and Germany. 
51 The research on the Netherlands, found, for example, a greater willingness to refer 
to the CJEU in the field of intellectual property or criminal cooperation and 
European arrest warrants. This could be compared with the idea of 'hotspots' of 
references of certain judges in particular fields of law. R.D. Kelemen & T. Pavone, 
'The political geography of European legal integration' (2017) unpublished; see also 
Dyevre et al (n 23). 
52 Wind (n 14); Pavone (n 14). 
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Figure 1: Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article builds on an innovative dataset gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with sixteen judges and court clerks involved in the referred 
migration cases listed in Table 3, as well as cases that were not referred. The 
dataset also includes judges who have no experience in referring ensuring a 
representative picture.53 Eleven interviewees work at the two highest 
administrative courts (ABRvS and CRvB). Five interviews were conducted 
with asylum judges from lower courts (Rb.). Given this limited number, 
findings with respect to lower courts should be interpreted with more care.54 
In order to protect the anonymity of interviewees, their names and identities 
                                                 
53 In order to make this selection, an overview was made of all judges involved in the 
referred cases as well as decisions not to refer. Two interviews were conducted in 
2015, while all others took place between April and November 2017. Almost all judges 
and court clerks that were approached for an interview were willing to cooperate. 
Only six judges refused or where unable to meet. 
54 Interviews 14, 22, 39, 51, 83. 
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are not disclosed.55 Note that this research is part of a broader research 
project for which, so far, 36 judges and court clerks have been interviewed.56 
There are clear limitations to interviews as a research instrument to identify 
motives.57 One problem is that asking judges about motives might encourage 
them to provide ex post rationalisations that do not reflect the decision 
making at the time they decided the case. To mitigate this problem, a recent 
time period (2013-2016) was chosen.58 As a result, most interviewees were also 
generally able to reflect on almost all cases in the selected time period. 
Another drawback of interview method is that interviewees might be 
tempted to give socially desirable answers and/or conceal their real 
motivations. Judges might also be reluctant to acknowledge that politico-
strategic reasons played a role in their decision to refer (or not) and conceal 
that they have engaged in such strategies. As it might conflict with their self-
perception or professional ethos of being an independent judge who decides 
on the basis of the law. Despite the secrecy of judicial deliberations, 
interviewees were relatively open, seemed honest and were willing to discuss 
individual cases. To alleviate the aforementioned problems, interviewees 
were, firstly, encouraged not to reflect on motives in general and in abstracto. 
Rather, they were asked to give concrete examples or probed to reflect on 
several specific judgments that were identified earlier during the legal 
analysis. Secondly, the idea was to interview more than one judge involved in 
certain (important) cases. Interviewees were, thirdly, given a convincing 
guarantee of confidentiality.59 Fourthly, the interview data were 
                                                 
55 A number between 0 and 100 was randomly selected for the interviews. Note that 
references to interview numbers is omitted when specific cases are discussed, 
because this would still make it possible to trace the identity of the interviewees on 
the basis of the published judgments. 
56 Jasper Krommendijk, 'De hoogste Nederlandse bestuursrechters en het Hof van 
Justitie: geboren danspartners? Het hoe en waarom van verwijzen' [The highest 
Dutch administrative courts and the CJEU; natural born dance partners? The ho 
wand why of reffering], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht (2017) 305. 
57 'Asking someone to identify his or her motive is one of the worst methods of 
measuring motives'. Lee Epstein, Gary King, 'The rules of inference' (2002) 69 
University of Chicago Law Review 1, 93. 
58 Ibid (n 46). 
59 Ibid (n 55). 
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complemented with the analysis of case law, extra-judicial writing of judges 
and secondary literature to triangulate the data as far as possible. As 
mentioned before, the triangulation of different sources illustrates the 
methodological originality of the article. 
A. Motives to Refer 
To establish the motives of judges to refer, all national court decisions to refer 
and to not refer in the time period 2013-2016 were analysed on the basis of the 
following three questions (see '1' in figure 1): Which considerations played a 
role in decisions (not) to refer to the CJEU? What were the reasons (not) to 
refer in the particular cases? How have the Cilfit-exceptions been interpreted 
and applied?  
The national court decisions not to refer were found on the basis of a careful 
database search of all published Dutch judgments with the search terms 
'prejudiciële vragen' [preliminary questions], '267 VWEU' [267 TFEU] and 
'Cilfit'.60 The disadvantage of this approach is that there could still be some 
cases in which a reference was appropriate, but which do not mention the 
issue of referring at all. It seems that the highest courts have been more eager 
in recent years to carefully reason why a reference is not necessary when one 
of the parties requested a reference as a result of the case law of the ECtHR 
(see section III.2.E).To alleviate the problem of discovering 'silent' 
judgments, two other strategies were used. First judgments of the lower 
courts in cases that were eventually referred to the CJEU by the highest court 
were consulted. Second, judgments were also found in the secondary 
literature.  
This being said, an analysis of judgments is not enough to establish the 
motives of judges to refer, especially because court judgments are often silent 
on other relevant considerations and calculations beyond purely legal 
(formalist) reasons. The analysis of judgments did not clarify why questions 
were raised in one case and not in another. Semi-structured interviews with 
judges were therefore conducted. The three open-ended questions set out 
above were raised during the interview to give judges the freedom to come up 
with reasons out of their own motion without being directed too much. Only 
                                                 
60 This search was conducted on rechtspraak.nl for the period 1-1-2013 t/m 31-12-2016. 
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at a later stage of the interview the judges were asked to reflect on some, but 
certainly not all, motives and factors identified in the literature discussed in 
section II.1. Lower court judges were also asked about their reasons not to 
refer the cases that were later referred by the highest court. In addition, 
judges were confronted with criticism from the relevant literature about the 
lack of referral in these cases. Tables 4 and 5 in section III provide an 
overview of the considerations mentioned by the 16 migration judges during 
interviews.61 
B. Follow-up 
For the second question, the national court's follow-up judgment was 
compared with the requested CJEU ruling to establish whether and how that 
court has applied the CJEU judgment (see '2' in figure 1). Secondary literature 
and commentaries were useful in conducting this analysis because they often 
contain criticism on the reasoning and approach of the CJEU and/or follow-
up by the referring court. 
This legal analysis was complemented with interviews with judges involved in 
these cases (see 'ideas national judge' in figure 1). The following 
questionswere firstly asked in general in an open way, whereby judges were 
encouraged to discuss specific cases out of their own motion: Is the reasoning 
of the CJEU sufficiently clear? Can CJEU judgments be applied easily in the 
national court case and be used to solve the dispute? Are there cases of 
incomplete follow-up, and why? Interviewees were subsequently questioned 
about specific CJEU rulings identified during the doctrinal analysis that were 
not mentioned by the interviewees themselves. 
C. Feedback Loops 
The third question on the feedback loops (see '3' in figure 1) was primarily 
answered on the basis of interviews during which judges were asked whether 
their interaction with the CJEU and its answers had an effect on their 
                                                 
61 Note, however, that one should be careful in drawing conclusion from this table. It 
was often difficult to classify whether an interviewee argued in line with a certain 
reason or factor, also because an interviewee could partly (dis)agree. It was therefore 
also decided not to mention in percentages how many judges considered a reason 
(ir)relevant. 
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willingness to refer cases in future. In addition, judges were also asked to 
reflect on the question as to whether they take the expected answer of the 
CJEU into account when deciding to refer or not. 
III. NATIONAL COURT'S DECISION TO REFER 
This section takes the motivations of judges (not) to refer as identified in the 
literature. As will be shown below, politico-strategic reasons play a more 
limited role in the context of migration than one would expect based on  the 
literature. Moreover, the results also do not support the expectation that 
such reasons play an important role in the highly Europeanised, judicialised 
and politicised field of migration (section III.1). The study, in fact, shows that 
non-strategic reasons can better explain the judges' decision (not) to refer 
(section III.2). 
1. Politico-strategic Reasons 
Section II.1 outlined three dominant theoretical perspectives on the politico-
strategic reasons for courts to refer: judicial empowerment ('sword'), 
sustained resistance ('shield') and bureaucratic politics ('leapfrog'). Only a few 
'sword' references (section II.1.A) and a couple more 'leapfrog' references, 
especially from lower courts (section III.1.B), were found in this study. This 
research did not find any support for the second theory that courts 
deliberately shield cases from the CJEU.62 
A. Judicial Empowerment: Protection vis-à-vis the Legislator 
The highest national courts have acted in line with the judicial empowerment 
hypothesis in a few instances. Several interviewees acknowledged this. But 
almost all of them mentioned the same two references of the Council of State 
in the area of migration as examples, one of which (Chakroun) precedes the 
2013-2016 time period. Chakroun dealt with a Dutch rule stipulating that 
family reunification could be refused to a sponsor who does not have a lasting 
                                                 
62 Nonetheless, it could be argued that when national courts do not refer in order to 
shield the national legislator they would not raise the issue of referral, because this 
would throw light on their 'disloyalty', at least from an EU perspective. For a 
discussion of the strategy to alleviate this problem, see section II.3. 
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and independent net income equal to at least 120% of the minimum wage in 
order to maintain himself and the members of his family.63 There was already 
quite a lot of criticism regarding the validity of this rule in the light of the 
Family Reunification Directive and the Council of State referred the case to 
the CJEU.64 Similar doubts about the legality of a national rule under EU law 
also played a role in a second case, K. and A., albeit more in the background. 
This case dealt with a Dutch rule which required the family members of a 
third country national residing lawfully in the Netherlands to pass a civic 
integration exam to enter the Netherlands. The Council of State referred to 
written observations of the Commission that this rule amounted to a breach 
of EU law.65 In cases such as Chakroun, it could be argued more cynically, as 
some interviewed judges did, that national courts are 'hiding behind the back' 
of the CJEU and that the CJEU is simply 'pulling the chestnuts out of the fire' 
for national courts.66 Some judges noted that in case of democratically 
adopted laws a judge should only make a decision after careful deliberation 
also in the light of the separation of powers.67 Some judges acknowledged that 
the CJEU is sometimes used by national courts to say what they already know 
with respect to an issue that is actually clair.68 Again, with respect to 
Chakroun, it was quite clear for the Council of State that the rule was contrary 
to EU law. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the Dutch 
courts have not shun away from striking down provisions in Dutch law in the 
field of migration without referring a question to the CJEU.69 The latter 
illustrates that the CJEU is not an indispensable ally. In addition, it also 
                                                 
63 Case C-578/08 Chakroun EU:C:2010:117. 
64 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. The European Commission held that this Dutch 
rule 'raise[s] particular concerns'. European Commission, 'On the application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification', COM(2008) 610/3, 7. 
65 These observations were made in the case of Imran, which was withdrawn. ABRvS 1 
April 2014 NL:RVS:2014:1196, para. 16, 20.1 and 28; Case C-153/14 K. and A. 
EU:C:2015:453. 
66 Interviews 18, 44. 
67 Interviews 18, 72. 
68 Interviews 10, 12, 18. 
69 ABRvS 26 April 2017 NL:RVS:2017:1109. 
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shows that Dutch courts are in general not acting in line with the shield-
thesis, protecting national legislation from EU law.70 
Table 4: overview of the interview replies in relation to the politico-strategic 
reasons  
 
B. Leapfrog: Bureaucratic Struggles among Courts 
Comparatively, more evidence was found in support for the leapfrog thesis of 
the bureaucratic politics model. At first sight, the quantitative data seems to 
give solid empirical support to this thesis, but this data is slightly misleading 
on its own, as will be discussed towards the end of the section. 
Four out of the five references in the period 2013-2016 of lower asylum courts 
were actually used by those courts to explicitly question the interpretation of 
EU law by the Council of State and to prompt the CJEU to 'correct' this 
restrictive interpretation.71 There are also two older cases that clearly 
illustrate the way in which lower asylum courts have turned to the CJEU as 
                                                 
70 Ibid (n 46) for the general willingness of Dutch courts to apply EU law. 
71 NL:RBDHA:2013:BZ5462 (Rajaby), para. 2.5.5; NL:RBDHA:2015:1004 (Ghezelbash); 
NL:RBDHA:2016:6389 (K.), para.19; NL:RBDHA:2016:12824 (A. and S.), para. 5.2. 
Theory Proxy 
Mentioned 
by judges 
out of their 
own motion 
as relevant 
Judges 
considered 
factor 
relevant 
when asked 
Judges 
considere
d factor 
irrelevant 
when 
asked 
Sword 
Strike down 
national law or 
policy; 
considerable 
financial 
consequences 
44; 10; 18 66 72; 89 
Shield 
Protect national 
legislation from 
EU law 
   
Leapfrog 
Challenge 
(another) higher 
court 
39  14; 22; 52 
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their ally.72 The first case is Y.S. and dealt with the right of access of asylum 
seekers to the minutes relating to the decision of the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service to grant a residence permit. These minutes are 
internal preparatory documents containing arguments and considerations 
which are relevant for the decision-making process. 73 They include personal 
data but also a legal analysis of these data in the light of the applicable rules.74 
The Council of State ruled in several cases that this legal analysis in the 
minutes does not constitute 'personal data' in the sense of the Law on the 
Protection of Personal Data transposing the Data Protection Directive, but 
contains the personal opinions of the case officer.75 Based on these 
considerations, the Council of State held that there is no right of access to 
these minutes.76 These judgments were criticised by scholars.77 In light of the 
criticism, it was not surprising that a lower judge saw a possibility to refer the 
matter to the CJEU in 2012. In its order for reference, the single-judge section 
of the district court Middelburg explicitly questioned the Council's 
restrictive interpretation of 'personal data' in the sense of the Data 
Protection Directive.78 The court also implicitly criticised the fact that the 
Council of State had not referred the matter to the CJEU. What makes this 
case so interesting is that the Council did not stand by idly, but also made a 
                                                 
72 Earlier the district court Zwolle asked questions in Imran about the compatibility of 
the civic integration exam with the Family Reunification Directive after the Council 
of State had ruled positively about this. The court, however, did not explicitly 
express its disagreement with the Council. Rb. 's-Gravenhage 31 March 2011 
NL:RBSGR:2011:BQ0453; C-155/11 Imran EU:C:2011:387. 
73 Joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12 YS EU:C:2014:2081. 
74 ABRvS 26 June 2008 NL:RVS:2008:BD6230, para. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2; Rb. Middelburg 15 
March 2012 NL:RBMID:2012:BV8942, para. 3.2. 
75 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
76 ABRvS 2 February 2011 NL:RVS:2011:BP2831; ABRvS 19 October 2011 
NL:RVS:2011:BT8554; ABRvS 2 November 2011 NL:RVS:2011:BU3136, para. 2.3.1. 
77 The critique was related to the restrictive interpretation of 'personal data', the 
limited reasoning of the Council of State, the insufficient attention for the Data 
Protection Directive as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Overkleeft-
Verburg in JB 2011/66; Klingenberg in JBP 2013/6. 
78 Rb. Middelburg 15 March 2012 NL:RBMID:2012:BV8942, para. 9. 
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reference for a preliminary ruling in a similar case. In its order, the Council 
made clear that it had not changed its opinion and explained its approach, 
while implicitly criticising the interpretation of the lower court.79 While 
Council's previous judgments on the same matter were motivated relatively 
shortly, the Council seemed to pull out all the stops to 'defend' itself in its 
order. By doing so, the Council also aimed at moving the CJEU in its 
direction by formulating the questions differently than the district court and 
in line with its own approach.80 The latter illustrates that rather than being 
merely a dialogue between CJEU and national courts, the preliminary ruling 
procedure also becomes a forum for dialogue between different national 
courts. 
The interpretation by the Council of State regarding the sufficiency of the 
safeguards in relation to mobile security monitoring checks was also 
challenged by a lower court in Jaoo/Adil.81 The Dutch law enabled officials to 
carry out such checks up to 20 kilometres from the land border to examine 
whether the persons stopped satisfied the residence requirements under 
certain safeguards.82 Confronted with a rebellious lower court that 
challenged its approach, the Council again referred the matter to the CJEU 
in order to 'defend' itself and explain the Dutch legal system more elaborately 
than the district court did.83 Note that the Council of State did not react to 
the four more recent leapfrog cases by referring to the CJEU as it previously 
                                                 
79 ABRvS 1 August 2012 NL:RVS:2012:BX3309, para. 2.23. 
80 The CJEU eventually sided with the Council of State. E.g. the first question: 'Should 
the second indent of Article 12(a) of [Directive 95/46] be interpreted to mean that 
there is a right to a copy of documents in which personal data have been processed, 
or is it sufficient if a full summary, in an intelligible form, of the personal data that 
have undergone processing in the documents concerned is provided?' With this 
question the Council of State seems to sketch some sort of middle way. In addition, 
the Council also sketches that a broad right of access would imply that reasons will 
no longer be included in the minute which would also disrupt the free and orderly 
decision making process. ABRvS 1 August 2012 NL:RVS:2012:BX3309, para. 2.27. 
81 Rb. Roermond 16 February 2012 NL:RBROE:2012:BV6172, para. 11. Case C-88/12 
Jaoo EU:C:2012:573. 
82 Such safeguards related to the intensity and frequency of the checks. The CJEU 
concluded that EU law did not prevent such checks. Case C-278/12 PPU Adil 
EU:C:2012:508. 
83 ABRvS 4 June2012, NL:RVS:2012:BW7489. 
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did in Y.S. and Jaoo/ Adil. A possible legal reason or justification for this 
silence could be that the CJEU has made it easier for higher courts to stick to 
their earlier finding of an acte clair in the case of Van Dijk. In this judgment, 
the CJEU held that the fact that other (national) courts ruled differently or 
did refer a question does not preclude the higher court from determining that 
the matter is clair.84 
The Council of State has not only been challenged by lower courts, but also 
by its administrative counterpart, the Tribunal, albeit in a more indirect way. 
In Chavez Vilchez, the Tribunal questioned the restrictive reading of 
Zambrano as laid down in the Aliens Circular, which contains the policy rules 
as applied by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service.85 The Circular 
only applied Zambrano, giving mothers a right of residence derived from the 
right of residence of their children, to situations where the father is not in a 
position to care for the child.86 
These cases suggest that the leapfrog thesis could explain a high number of 
references. The previous overview, however, neglects that many lower court 
judges are actually reluctant to refer.87 Three out of the five interviewed lower 
court judges clearly rejected the idea of 'leapfrogging'. The majority of lower 
court judges think that it is primarily up to the highest courts to refer, given 
their more limited law making function as first instance courts or because 
they are simply more loyal to the highest courts.88 This preference for the 
highest courts to refer was not only mentioned during interviews, but is also 
laid down in a memo issued by the Committee of the Presidents of the 
                                                 
84 Joined cases C-72/14, C-197/14 X. & Van Dijk EU:C:2015:564, paras. 56-63. 
85 CRvB 16 March 2015 NL:CRVB:2015:665, para. 4.2; C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez 
EU:C:2017:354; Case C-34/09 Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. 
86 The Tribunal did, however, not mention the case law of the Council of State upon 
which this restrictive reading was based. ABRvS 9 August 2013 NL:RVS:2013:2837.  
87 Table 3 shows that lower court judges referred five cases to the CJEU in four years. 
It could be argued that this is not a lot in the light of the fact that Dutch lower courts 
handle hundreds of migration cases every year. EU law plays an important role in 
these cases, because migration is almost completely Europeanised. See supra n 50. 
Kees Groenendijk & Mirjam van Riel, 'Migratierecht is bijna helemaal Unierecht' 
[Migration law is almost completely EU law] Asiel & Migratierecht 9 (2017) 405. 
88 Interview 14, 22, 51.  
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Administrative Law Departments of District Courts.89 Likewise, 
Groenendijk referred to a 'gentlemen's agreement' between the Council of 
State and lower asylum courts that is the Council of State who should in 
principle refer.90 Only one interviewed judge seemed to endorse the 'leapfrog' 
argument, since he/she referred to 'a bad taste in his/her mouth' as a result of 
the restrictive case law of the Council of State and mentioned the option of 
referring as an important mechanism to challenge this case law.91 Another 
judge took a more middle-ground position to give the highest courts the 
chance to rule on an issue first. He/she would only refer when the highest 
courts are not taking up their responsibility and do something 'strange'.92 
Summing up, there have been several references in which politico-strategic 
reasons played a role, especially leapfrog-references of lower migration courts 
in which they challenged the restrictive approach of the Council of State. 
However, politico-strategic reasons can only explain a limited number of 
references and certainly not explain the cases that have not been referred. 
These strategic reasons also fail to explain the reluctance of many lower court 
judges to refer given their respect for the judicial hierarchy. As the interviews 
show, the idea of leapfrogging is not widely shared among lower court judges. 
This is further illustrated by the fact that the great majority of Dutch 
references come from the highest courts.93 The composition of the interview 
sample – 11 higher court versus 5 lower court judges – can also explain the 
seeming difference between the outcomes on the basis of the legal analysis –  
finding some leapfrog cases – and the denial of strategic reasons by judges. In 
addition, the differences could also stem from the earlier mentioned fact that 
                                                 
89 One advantage for the highest courts is that they could more easily bundle similar 
cases. In addition, the highest courts have more experience, time and staff to prepare 
references. Interview 83. Memo van het Landelijke Overleg Voorzitters sectoren 
Bestuursrecht van de rechtbanken (LOVB), Sandra van 't Hof, 'Werkwijze stellen 
van prejudiciële vragen', 12 June 2013. For further discussion and analysis, see Jasper 
Krommendijk, 'De lagere rechter aan banden. Is er nog ruimte voor de lagere rechter 
om te verwijzen naar het HvJ?'[The lower court judge restricted. Is there still room 
for the lower court judge to refer to the CJEU?] (2018) SEW 183. 
90 Groenendijk (n 32). 
91 Interview 39. 
92 Interview 83. 
93 Ibid (n 22). 
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judges (un)consciously hide strategic reasons, because acknowledging such 
considerations would conflict with their self-image and professional ethos of 
being a judge.94 More research is thus necessary to further substantiate the 
claim that non-strategic reasons matter most.  
The research conducted so far on Dutch references suggests that politico-
strategic reasons play an even more limited role in fields other than 
migration.95 One former asylum judge who now practices in tax law observed 
that the confrontational relationship between different levels in the judicial 
hierarchy is typical for asylum law, where emotions and moral or ethical 
considerations play a bigger role than in an area such as tax law.96  
2. Non-strategic Reasons 
This section examines non-strategic reasons for (not) referring which have 
been described in section II.1.B. It shows that judges primarily decide (not) 
to refer for pragmatic reasons (section III.2.B), whereby personal – and to a 
lesser extent institutional – factors also play an important role (section 
III.2.C-D). The parties have only a limited influence on this referral decision 
(section III.2.E). The interviews and legal analysis found hardly any support 
for the legal formalist idea attributing references to the judges' eagerness to 
comply with their obligation to refer, or more broadly, to apply EU law 
(section III.2.A). 
Table 5: overview of the interview replies in relation to the non-strategic 
reasons 
Theory Proxy 
Mentioned 
by judges 
out of 
their own 
motion as 
relevant 
Judges 
considered 
factor 
relevant 
when 
asked 
Judges 
considered 
factor 
irrelevant 
when 
asked 
Compliance 
pull/ legal 
The need to 
comply with 
the obligation 
66; 24; 91; 
72 
  
                                                 
94 Ibid (n 58-60). 
95 Krommendijk (n 89). 
96 Interview 51. 
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formalism 
(2.2.1) 
to refer/ 
correct 
application of 
the Cilfit 
doctrine 
Pragmatism 
(2.2.2) 
Need of legal 
clarity; answer 
perceived 
necessary to 
resolve the 
case 
83; 66; 43; 
91; 89; 10, 
72 
  
Reasonable 
reading of 
Cilfit 
44; 66; 89; 
10; 18; 72 
  
Natural 
reluctance 
(e.g. decide 
themselves) 
22, 14;25; 
66; 81; 44; 
72; 89 
  
Importance 
of the 
question 
12; 24; 66; 
44; 12; 72; 
18 
  
Consequences 
of referring 
for the parties 
22; 66; 24; 
91 
  
Efficiency/ 
delay in the 
case (and 
other cases) 
22; 83; 14; 
91; 72; 10; 18 
 39 
Resources 
necessary to 
write 
question, time 
 24; 66 39 
Personal/ 
Psychological 
(2.2.3)  
Position in 
the career 
10, 44   
Background/ 
expertise 
10, 44   
Knowledge of 
EU law/ 
procedure 
14   
Self-
perception: 
e.g. lower 
22; 83; 14; 51   
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courts as fact 
finders 
Fear to ask 
(wrong) 
question 
14   
Satisfaction of 
writing a 
reference/ 
contributing 
to EU law 
12; 10; 39  44 
Institutional 
(2.2.4) 
Awareness 
(e.g. 
specialised 
EU law 
committees in 
courts) 
66; 24; 18, 
44, 81, 89. 
  
Case 
management 
(backlog of 
cases) 
44; 18; 89   
Request of 
the Parties 
(2.2.5) 
Parties 
requested 
referral 
22; 91; 44  83; 66; 24; 
43; 10, 12, 
91; 72 
 
A. Compliance Pull/ Legal Formalism 
During the interviews, only some judges mentioned the formalist reason that 
a case is referred with the idea of complying with the obligation to refer under 
Article 267 TFEU. Most judges emphasised that a referral is made because 
there is uncertainty regarding the meaning of a particular provision, for 
example, because it is used in contradictory ways in EU rules or has not been 
interpreted by the CJEU before.97  
Further support for the idea that legal formalist considerations do not figure 
prominently in judges' mind is that almost all judges of the highest courts 
                                                 
97 Interviews 10, 43, 66, 72, 83, 89, 91. One example is the case of Zh. and O. in which it 
was unclear whether there are differences in the interpretation of 'public order' for 
EU citizens or third country nationals. Case C-554/13, Zh. and O. EU:C:2015:377. 
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generally employ a 'reasonable reading' of the Cilfit-exceptions.98 Several 
judges held that when the question is 75-80% clair, there is no need to refer, 
especially in the field of migration where it would be possible to send a 
handful of cases to Luxemburg every week.99 The question is not only 
whether there is doubt, but also whether the reference is 'worth the effort'. 
These views thus suggest that Cilfit is in practice not applied word-for-word, 
but rather with 'common sense' where other considerations play a role.100 
Some judges acknowledged that they (implicitly) apply the less strict Köbler 
'test'. On the basis of this test, there is only a problem, namely state liability, 
'in the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infringed the 
applicable law' which does not include the incorrect reading of CJEU 
judgments.101 Given the reasonable reading of Cilfit, it is not surprising that 
judges of the Council of State interpreted the CJEU judgments in Ferreira and 
Van Dijk as giving more leeway to national courts.102 Especially in Van Dijk, 
the CJEU confirmed that the fact that other (national) courts ruled 
differently or did refer a question does not detract from the highest court's 
conclusion that the matter is clair. The Council used these judgments as an 
additional justification for non-referral in several migration cases.103 One 
lower court judge held that this reasonable Cilfit-reading by the Council of 
State is done selectively whereby van Dijk is merely used as a fig leaf, while 
                                                 
98 'A reasonable reading of Cilfit' is also mentioned in Association of the Councils of 
State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU and Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (ACA), 'Report of the working 
group on the preliminary rulings procedure', www.aca-europe.eu/seminars/ 
2007_DenHaag/Final_report.pdf, last accessed 31 July 2018, 10-11.  
99 Interviews 44, 66, 89; Sevenster & Wissels (n 32) 90. 
100 Interviews 18, 44, 72; Hanna Sevenster, 'Good old Cilfit – pleidooi voor een 'make-
over'' [Good old Cilfit – plea for a 'make-over'] in Tristan Baumé et al (eds), Today's 
Multi-layered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives: Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Arjen W.H. Meij (Paris 2011) 297; Sevenster & Wissels (n 32) 91. 
101 Interviews 10, 18; Case C-224/01 Köbler EU:C:2003:513, paras. 53.  
102 Joined cases C-72/14 & C-197/14 X. & Van Dijk EU:C:2015:564, paras. 56-63; Case C-
160/14 Ferreira da Silva EU:C:2015:565, paras. 40-42; Sevenster & Wissels (n 32) 87-
89. 
103 See several post-J.N. cases; ABRvS 13 May 2016 NL:RVS:2016:1624, 1383 and 1384. 
See also the credibility assessment cases. ABRvS 13 April 2016 NL:RVS:2016:890, 
891; ABRvS 5 December 2016 NL:RVS:2016:3231.  
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another judge noted that the Council of State should have referred more (or 
other) questions.104 
B. Pragmatism 
The interviews and legal analysis clearly show that judges primarily operate in 
a pragmatic way and include various considerations in their decision (not) to 
refer. There is a natural tendency among judges to avoid referring a case to 
the CJEU all too easily, especially among judges from the highest courts. It is 
further illustrated by the reasonable reading of Cilfit.105 This 'natural 
reluctance' means that disputes are primarily solved on other grounds, 
preferably national grounds. Both existing literature and interviews show 
that national court judges' first instinct is to decide themselves even though 
they do not resist CJEU intervention as such, as will be later argued (section 
IV.2).106 This also means that a case is not immediately referred when there 
is only the slightest doubt.107 The reluctance to refer among lower court 
judges primarily stems from the way in which they perceive their judicial 
function as 'primary' courts of fact finding (see section III.1.B).  
The first reason for the general reluctance is that formulating questions, as 
well as the order of reference, is extremely time consuming and labour 
intensive.108 One judge stated that formulating a preliminary reference is as 
difficult as answering it.109 A lower court judge also noted that it is easier to 
decide the case yourself.110 A second reason for the reluctance is that a referral 
means that not only the referred case, but also similar cases are put on hold 
until the CJEU hands down a judgment.111 Such a delay plays an especially 
important role in the field of migration where there are often many, possibly 
                                                 
104 Interviews 39 and 83. 
105 Interviews 10, 44, 89; Sevenster (94) 305. 
106 Sevenster & Wissels (n 34) 187; Interviews 10, 66, 72, 81, 89. 
107 Interviews 18, 44. 
108 This is also because the highest courts have the practice of involving many judges and 
référendaires. Interviews 24, 66, 81. 
109 Sevenster (94) 301. 
110 This judge also stated that it costed two months of extra work in addition to normal 
work flow. Interview 39. 
111 Interviews 14, 39, 83. Sevenster & Wissels (n 32) 90. 
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hundreds of cases, in which the same question is discussed.112 The interviewed 
judges acknowledged that justice would come to a standstill if every question 
of EU law about which there is doubt was immediately referred to the 
CJEU.113 In the same vein, the current President of the Aliens Chamber of 
the Council of State, Nico Verheij, stated that a responsible judge takes into 
consideration the consequences of such a delay.114 The consequences of a 
referral on other cases seems to be less of a relevant consideration for lower 
court judges.115 These two reasons for the general reluctance also have an 
institutional dimension which relate to the capacity and case management 
system within courts (see section III.2.D). 
Having described the general reluctance and the pragmatic mindset of 
judges, the following questions remain: how do judges make the decision 
(not) to refer in concrete cases and what considerations play a role? The 
decision (not) to refer primarily boils down to a balancing exercise between 
conflicting interests: the importance of the question versus the costs of the 
delay in terms of cases that need to be put on hold and the impact on 
society.116 Judges held that referral is less likely when an issue is only 
incidental or relates to legislation which has been changed already or will be 
changed in the near future. An exception to this is when it relates to an 
important matter of principle.117 Nonetheless, when the question is too 
important in terms of the number of people and cases affected, it could be 
more logical not to refer, because it is not considered desirable to put all too 
many cases on hold for an uncertain period of time.118 A recent example in 
which this dilemma played a role are the cases on the intensity of review of 
the credibility assessment of the asylum claim in relation to Article 46(3) of 
                                                 
112 Interview 14. See also ABRvS 14 July 2011 NL:RVS:2011:BR3771, para. 2.8.4. 
Sevenster & Wissels (n 31) 92; Groenendijk (n 32). 
113 Interviews 10, 18. 
114 Nico Verheij, 'Voorwoord' [Foreword], in Bosma et al (n 32) 83. 
115 Interview 39. One judge was silent on this, while another also brought up these 
consequences. Interviews 22, 83. 
116 Interviews 44, 72, 89; De la Mare and Donnelly (n 6) 372 
117 Interviews 12, 18, 24, 32, 44, 66; Sevenster (94) 301. 
118 Interview 18. 
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the Asylum Procedures Directive.119 The Council of State explicitly 
acknowledged that the text of Article 46(3) of the Procedures Directive does 
not provide a definite answer and noted that there was no case law of the 
CJEU (yet) clarifying this provision.120 Instead of referring those open 
questions to the CJEU, the Council answered those questions itself and held 
that the judicial review of the credibility assessment should be more intensive 
than was common practice to that date. This was also because a referral would 
mean that the Council 'could almost shut down' as these questions went to 
the core of its work and would imply that a very large number of cases had to 
be put on hold. Nonetheless, sometimes judges considered that a referral was 
unavoidable in order to give judgment, despite the high number of affected 
cases. This has been seen for instance in the case A., B., C. which considered 
the intensity of review of the credibility of a declared sexual orientation of an 
asylum seeker.121 Some judges, also from lower courts, stated that they also 
consider the position of the affected person(s) and examine whether a 
reference has negative consequences for the parties.122 One lower court judge, 
for example, noted that judges should be careful in referring a legal question 
when this is not 'helping' the asylum seeker. This judge argued that he/she 
would have never referred Ghezelbash, which concerned the right to an 
effective legal remedy under the Dublin III Regulation for this reason.123 This 
is because a reference would lead to considerable delay with an uncertain 
outcome that could also be against the interests of the asylum seeker. 
Another court decided to refer the case, but the Council of State annulled the 
judgment of the referring lower court leaving Ghezelbash empty handed.124 
                                                 
119 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
[2013] OJ L 180/60. 
120 ABRvS 13 April 2016 NL:RVS:2016:890-891, para. 5.2. 
121 Joined cases C-148/13 until C-150/13 A., B., C. EU:C:2014:2406. 
122 Interviews 22, 32, 91. 
123 Regulation (EU) No.604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] OJ 
L180/31; Case C-63/15 Ghezelbash EU:C:2016:409. 
124 ABRvS 18 May 2017, NL:RVS:2017:1326; Interview 22. 
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Judges from the highest courts mentioned other pragmatic and practical 
considerations. Sometimes judges decide not to refer and to wait until a case 
that lends itself better for referral comes before the court. That way, the 
latter case allows the court to show the full picture of the issue to the CJEU.125 
At the same time, judges occasionally considered it necessary to refer even 
though similar questions were already referred to the CJEU by other courts. 
The reason was to 'feed' the CJEU with the view of the court and to make 
clear that certain issues also play a role in other Member States. One example 
is the case of G. and R. on the right to be heard in relation to the extension of 
detention of illegally staying third-country nationals.126 The Dutch Supreme 
Court had already asked similar questions about the right to be heard and the 
consequences of breaches of those rights from the perspective of the rights 
of defence.127 The Council of State considered it necessary to refer this case 
to underline the differences between the context of the two different fields 
of law, namely customs and asylum. Moreover, the Council wanted a quick 
answer in G. and R. because the claimant was in detention. It therefore 
successfully submitted a question via the urgent preliminary ruling (PPU) 
procedure. The Council also decided to refer in K. and A. about civic 
integration requirements despite there being partly similar question raised by 
a German court in Dogan.128 However, the German court's question had a 
subsidiary character which entailed the risk of the CJEU not answering it.129 
C. Personal/ Psychological Factors 
This study also found that personal factors and personal differences among 
judges influence to what extent the judges are willing and able to refer. This 
research did not find much support for the thesis that the limited knowledge 
of EU law and the preliminary ruling procedure is an obstacle for referring.130 
This is illustrated by the relatively high number of references in the field of 
                                                 
125 Interview 10; Sevenster & Wissels (n 33) 91. 
126 Case C-383/13 PPU G. and R. EU:C:2013:533. 
127 Case C-437/13 Unitrading EU:C:2014:2318. 
128 Case C-138/13 Dogan EU:C:2014:2066. 
129 ABRvS 1 April 2014 NL:RVS:2014:1196, para. 27. 
130 Only one lower court judge mentioned this as an obstacle. Interview 14. Another 
lower court judge also acknowledged that there is too limited expertise to refer in 
Zambrano cases. Interview 22. 
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migration and the eagerness of judges to engage with EU law.131 In addition, 
migration law is highly Europeanised which means that judges are simply 
forced to be experts in EU law.132 Having said that, the (EU law) background 
of judges matters. Judges, who have an academic or governmental 
background and/or have more EU law expertise, have a more positive attitude 
towards the CJEU and are more accustomed with working with a 
supranational court as the highest authority. By contrast, career judges find it 
more annoying to refer since it disturbs their autonomy as a judge deciding 
on disputes, as well as the national judicial process.133 One judge with a 
background in EU law held that it is not surprising that career judges who 
have had a lifelong career in the judiciary and have made it to the top court 
are not all of a sudden completely devoted to the CJEU, but instead have a 
more sceptic attitude in the sense of 'Is it up to the CJEU to determine 
this'?134 As mentioned before, there are also clear differences between lower 
court judges in terms of their perception of their judicial function as 'primary' 
courts of fact (see section III.1.B). 
The literature has also identified psychological considerations. During 
interviews, very few judges actually mentioned those. Only some lower court 
judges expressed a fear that they might miss essential points in their reference 
and, hence, prefer not to refer at all.135 There were, however, a couple of judges 
who argued in the opposite way by stating that they enjoy writing a good 
reference.136 Some judges even mentioned that they derive satisfaction from 
referring to the CJEU, also because they could contribute to the 
development of EU law.137 
                                                 
131 Ibid (n 44-45). 
132 Groenendijk & van Riel (n 87). 
133 Interviews 10, 44. 
134 Interview 10. 
135 Interview 14. Another judge gave this as an explanation as to why a reference costs so 
much time. Interview 39. 
136 Interviews 10, 44. 
137 At the same time, they noted that the primary purpose of the procedure is to solve a 
dispute. Interviews 10, 12, 39. 
138 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
D. Institutional 
Institutional factors matter as well and can explain why the two highest 
courts have become less reluctant to refer over time, also in the field of 
migration. While the Council of State was criticised years ago for not paying 
sufficient attention to EU law and withholding references from the CJEU, 
experts acknowledge that this has improved in recent years.138 Several 
institutional reasons account for this, including better coordination of EU 
law questions, the creation of a committee on EU law and a documentation 
service that keeps close track of EU law developments.139 Both the Council of 
State and Tribunal have regular meetings where EU law developments are 
discussed.140 In addition, more judges with a prominent EU law background 
have been appointed to the Council since 2005.141  
There are some institutional factors that discourage references. Some judges 
acknowledged that the case management system within courts affects the 
general (reluctant) attitude towards referring. Both the financial system 
rewarding judges based on the number of cases they decide and the increasing 
pressure on the capacity of courts favour a tendency to solve disputes without 
referring.142  
E. The Role of the Parties 
Another factor influencing the courts willingness to refer is the role of the 
parties and their requests to refer. The legal analysis and the interviews show 
that such requests have only had a minimal impact to the highest courts and 
most decisions to refer were made by courts from their own motion.143 
                                                 
138 Groenendijk held that the Council of State did not take its task as highest court in 
relation to EU migration and asylum law seriously before 2008. Kees Groenendijk in 
JV 2011/4, par. 1.  
139 Interviews 18, 44, 81, 89. 
140 Interviews 24, 66, 89. 
141 This could also be partly attributed to Mortelmans (2005-2016), who also 
championed the use of the preliminary ruling procedure. Interview 44. 
142 Interviews 14, 20. 
143 Interview 10, 12, 43, 91. It could also be that the parties themselves are not in favour 
of referring because of the delay, which is, however, also not considered to be 
decisive for a court. E.g. NL:RVS:2014:27; Interview 10, 72. 
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National courts are not obliged to act on – or even take into account – such 
requests.144 It seems, however, that lower court judges attach more 
importance to parties' requests.145 The limited impact of requests is 
illustrated by Table 6 which indicates that in the majority of decisions of the 
lowest and highest courts not to refer there was an explicit reference to a 
request by (one of) the parties. This number is possibly even higher, because 
it could well be that courts do not explicitly mention that there was a request. 
Judges of both the Council of State and Tribunal noted that they have started 
to refer to the parties' requests consistently as a result of the case law of the 
ECtHR which requires courts to do so on the basis of Article 6 ECHR.146 
Several lower court judges were not aware of this case law, but nonetheless 
emphasised the importance of providing reasons when a well-founded 
request was made.147 Table 7 shows that in only two of the thirteen referred 
cases there was a request of the parties to refer. Nonetheless, it could be that 
courts sometimes omit a reference to a request because they do not consider 
such reasoning necessary.148 Even though one should be careful in 
interpreting the quantitative data on their own, those data were confirmed 
during the interviews. An explanation for the limited impact of requests of 
the parties is that, as several interviewees noted, the quality of the requests 
differs and only few of them are serious and well-founded.149 
Table 6: The decisions not to refer that mention a request of (one of) the 
parties 
                                                 
144 Case 283/81 Cilfit EU:C:1982:335, para. 9. 
145 One judge even held that he would almost never refer without one of the parties 
making such a request. Interview 22. 
146 Interviews 5, 10, 12, 31, 69, 77; Sevenster & Wissels (n 32) 89;  Dhahbi v Italy ECHR 
nr. 17120/09 CE:ECHR:2014:0408JUD001712009; Schipani v Italy ECHR nr. 
38369/09; CE:ECHR:2015:0721JUD003836909. 
147 Interviews 22, 83. One judge was aware of this case law and also held that this case law 
is applicable to lower courts, despite this being far from clear. Interview 39. For a 
discussion, see Jasper Krommendijk, ''Open Sesame!' Improving access to the CJEU 
by obliging national courts to reason their refusals to refer' (2017) 1 European Law 
Review 46. 
148 Interview 89. 
149 Interviews 10, 12, 24, 72. 
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Council of 
State 
Tribunal 
Lower asylum 
courts 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Request is 
explicitly 
mentioned 
18 69% 0 0% 35 73% 53 71% 
Request is 
not 
mentioned 
8 31% 1 100% 13 27% 22 29% 
Total 
26 100% 1 100% 48 100% 75 
100
% 
 
Table 7: The referred cases that mention a request of (one of) the parties 
 
 
Council of 
State 
Tribunal 
Lower asylum 
courts 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Request is 
explicitly 
mentioned 
1150 20% 0 0% 1151 20% 2 15% 
Request is 
not 
mentioned 
4 80% 3 100% 4 80% 11 85% 
Total 5 100% 3 100% 5 100% 13 100% 
 
Despite the limited impact of parties' requests to refer in the investigated 
period, there have been a couple of successful instances whereby a joint and 
organised endeavour of asylum lawyers, academic EU law experts and NGOs 
managed to obtain a referral.152 This includes Imran, referred to the CJEU in 
2011 by the district court of Zwolle, which concerns the compatibility of the 
civic integration exam with the Family Reunification Directive.153 Also Sahin, 
                                                 
150 NL:RVS:2014:1196 (K. and A.). 
151 NL:RBDHA:2016:12824 (A. and S.), para. 3. Interviews confirmed that there was no 
request in Rajaby and Ghezelbash. For the other two referral it is (yet) unknown. 
152 For an account of a successful case of bottom-up legal mobilisation in relation to the 
Return Directive in Italy, see Virginia Passalacqua, 'El Dridi upside down: a case of 
legal mobilization for undocumented migrants' rights in Italy', Tijdschrift voor 
Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht (2016) 215. 
153 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. Jos Hoevenaars, A people's court? A bottom-up 
approach to litigation before the Court of Justice of the European Union (Eleven 
International Publishing 2018) 209. 
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referred to the CJEU by the Council of State in 2006, was instigated by a 
Working Group set up in 2003 with a view to obtain a reference to the CJEU 
in order to challenge the increased administrative fees for residence 
permits.154 In several other cases, such (academic) experts have only got 
involved after references were made.155 A Strategic Litigation Committee, 
consisting of academics and asylum lawyers, has been active since 2014 and is 
actively looking for cases which can be brought before the CJEU or the 
ECtHR. This Committee has so far had little impact.156 Of the thirteen 
referred cases included in this article, the Committee was only involved after 
the reference was made in J.N. and Ghezelbash. 
When discussing the role of the parties in relation to the instigation of a 
reference it is also important to discuss the position of the State Secretary for 
Justice and Security which is responsible for asylum and migration. It could 
be argued that this 'party' has had a greater effect on the willingness or ability 
of courts to refer. This is because the State Secretary has used its power in, 
for example, Imran and Rajaby to issue a residence permit strategically in 
order to avoid a referral or prevent a reference from being answered by the 
CJEU.157 When the State Secretary does so, a ruling from the CJEU is no 
longer necessary because it can obviously not affect the outcome of the case. 
As a result, the case is withdrawn from the docket of the CJEU. There are 
also cases where the court expressed an intention to refer, and draft questions 
were already prepared, but the case was settled (shortly) before being lodged 
with the CJEU.158 The risk or threat of a reference can thus change the 
behaviour of the State Secretary. 
                                                 
154 Hoevenaars (n 152) 215. 
155 Examples include the case of Elgafaji (n 46) and Zambrano (n 49). Hoevenaars (n 152) 
212-213. 
156 The project leader, Sadhia Rafi, confirmed that until March 2017 the work of the 
committee has not caused a court to refer. The request of the parties as well as a note 
of the committee were, however, referred to in NL:RVS:2016:890-891. See also the, 
so far unsuccessful, strategic litigation case of the Dutch Public Interest Litigation 
Project with respect to Afghan 1F'ers. NL:RBDHA:2017:11809. 
157 C-155/11 Imran EU:C:2011:387; C-158/13 Rajaby. See also Baumgärtel (n 45) 11-13. 
158 Groenendijk (n 32) 17-18. 
142 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
In sum, this section provided an overview of a myriad of reasons and factors 
affecting the willingness of judges to refer, even though some have a more 
limited explanatory value (see table 9 for an overview). The preceding analysis 
shows that several non-political reasons or factors play a more important role 
than political reasons for the decision (not) to refer. There is often more than 
one reason that could explain a decision (not) to refer, sometimes even 
conflicting reasons for and against. Hence, it is very difficult to explain the 
judicial decision-making in relation to referring to the CJEU by a single 
factor. 
IV. THE NATIONAL COURT'S FOLLOW-UP  
The second question of this article deals with the follow-up to the 
preliminary rulings by the national court. Dutch judges have generally been 
content with their interaction with the CJEU and its judgments (section 
IV.1). At the same time, the judges discussed several unclear and problematic 
judgments during the interviews (section IV.2). They also expressed concerns 
about the functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure and the limited 
'dialogue' with the CJEU (section IV.3). However, these factors did not affect 
their willingness to apply the CJEU judgment to the national dispute. On the 
contrary, they applied almost all judgments fully and automatically (section 
IV.4). This once again bears witness to the pragmatism on the part of national 
judges. 
1. Judges' Satisfaction with the Usefulness of CJEU Judgments 
What is interesting about the perception of CJEU rulings by national judges 
is that they assess them not so much from an analytical perspective. They are 
not interested in whether the CJEU answered all questions satisfactorily and 
in line with its earlier jurisprudence. Rather, what matters most for national 
judges is whether the CJEU judgment helps them to solve the case at hand.159 
This means that judges primarily look at what the CJEU has said and whether 
that is easily applicable, instead of focusing on what the CJEU failed to say.160 
This is not to say that judges disagreed with the shortcomings identified in 
                                                 
159 See also Micklitz (n 30) 433. 
160 Interviews 10, 18, 91. 
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the academic literature, such as the insufficient judicial reasoning, incorrect 
rephrasing of the question, or a neglect of some questions or the reasoning of 
the referring court. Almost all judges acknowledged these deficiencies. But it 
did not prevent them from concluding that a ruling by the CJEU was useful. 
During the interviews, most judges named several judgments – elsewhere 
criticised as deficient – that they considered adequate, as illustrated in Table 
8. One example that shows the difference of perspective is J.N., which 
concerned the detention of third country nationals with a view to their 
removal. While the CJEU only paid relatively limited attention to the 
relationship between Article 8(3) of the Reception Conditions Directive and 
the case law of the ECtHR, which was explicitly included in the questions of 
the Council of State, the judgment was considered useful.161 
Table 8: Overview of cases that were explicitly discussed during interviews162 
Referring 
court 
Clear and useful 
judgments 
In between Unclear and 
problematic 
judgments 
Council 
of State 
C-383/13 PPU, G. and 
R.  
C-554/13, Zh. and O. 
C-153/14, K. and A. 
C-601/15 PPU, J.N. 
C-148/13-150/13, A., 
B., C. 
C-187/10, Unal 
 
C-225/12, Demir 
Tribunal  C-579/13, P. and S. C-485/07, Akdas 
Lower 
courts 
C-63/15, Ghezelbash   
 
Almost all interviewed judges held that the judgments of the CJEU are 
generally useful.163 Some interviewees were a bit more critical and emphasised 
that the quality varied.164 At the same time, they acknowledged that such 
criticism with respect to certain judgments is normal and is something they 
                                                 
161 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
[2013] OJ L180/96; Case C-601/15 PPU J.N. EU:C:2016:84. 
162 The following judgments of the Tribunal were not discussed in interviews: C-171/13 
Demirci; C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez. The same holds true for the district court cases C-
550/16 A. and S; C-331/16 K.; C-18/16 K. (no CJEU judgments at the moment of 
interviewing); C-158/13 Rajaby (removed). 
163 Interviews 10, 12, 18, 24, 44, 66, 72, 91.  
164 Interviews 18, 24, 89.  
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are familiar with themselves.165 One judge held that approximately 80% of the 
requested CJEU rulings were answered in a satisfactory way, while another 
noted that three out of ten cases were less satisfactory.166 
2. Unclear and Problematic CJEU judgments 
There have hardly been any judgments that judges considered impossible to 
implement. The exception is the 'extremely difficult' case of Demir 
concerning the meaning of the term 'legally resident' in Article 13 of the 
Association Council Decision 1/80. This judgment was referred to as a true 
'brainteaser' that needed to be studied for days to grasp its meaning.167 
Despite their general satisfaction, judges discussed several CJEU judgments 
that they considered problematic. What judges found most troublesome is 
that CJEU judgments contain an unclear answer or no answer at all. Some 
judges held that especially in the migration law area, the CJEU renders too 
many judgments that lack an unambiguous answer, while including several 
criteria for individual assessments instead of clear-cut and automatic 
limits.168 One lower court judge noted that referring courts should be critical 
towards themselves as well, because an unclear question inevitably leads to an 
unclear or vague answer from the CJEU.169 The Tribunal was confronted with 
a rather ambiguous judgment in P. and S. about the obligatory integration 
exam under pain of a fine. The CJEU gave the Tribunal the difficult task to 
examine whether the means of implementing that obligation jeopardise the 
objectives of the Directive on third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents. The CJEU required the Tribunal to consider the 'specific 
individual circumstances'.170 The case A., B., C. was also mentioned as an 
example in this context, because according to some judges, the CJEU only 
mentioned what courts could not do in order to assess the credibility of a 
                                                 
165 Interviews 10, 44.  
166 Interviews 91, 10.  
167 Several flow charts were made for this purpose. Case C-225/12 Demir EU:C:2013:725. 
168 Interviews 66, 72, 81, 89. 
169 Interview 83. 
170 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ L16/44; Case C-579/13 P. 
and S. EU:C:2015:369, para 49. 
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declared sexual orientation of an asylum seeker.171 One judge even asked 
whether it was useful to refer in the end, because of the loss in time and the 
fact that the CJEU completely left it to the national court to solve the case 
on the basis of considerations that the Council of State had already identified 
and discussed before referral. 
Instead of these 'deference' judgments with very general answers that 
completely defer to the national court on the point of law, the interviewed 
judges preferred so-called 'outcome' judgments, as they give a very specific 
answer that leaves no margin for manoeuvre for the national court.172 This 
goes contrary to the argument in the literature that national courts actually 
do not like CJEU judgments that are too 'interventionist', because judges 
perceive such 'excessive intervention' as an usurpation of their own 
jurisdiction or as infantilisation of their own role.173 In fact, the interviews 
provide very little support for the argument that national courts disfavour 
'interventionist' judgments. Only one judge was critical about a very detailed 
CJEU judgment that closely interpreted national law, but this judgment was 
outside the field of migration.174 Judges opted for the contrary view and 
expressed their content with CJEU rulings that almost solved the case at 
hand. One example is K. and A. about the requirement for family members of 
a third country to pass a civic integration exam. The CJEU went into great 
detail in interpreting Dutch law and by hinting at a breach of EU law. It left 
little room for manoeuvre to the Council of State because it held itself that 
the requirement and the high fees make it impossible or excessively difficult 
to exercise the right to family reunification.175 Judges did not consider the 
approach of the CJEU problematic, but valued the clear directions offered.  
                                                 
171 Joined cases C-148/13 until C-150/13 A., B., C. EU:C:2014:2406. 
172 Tridimas (n 6). 
173 Gareth Davies, 'Abstractness and concreteness in the preliminary reference 
procedure: implications for the division of powers and effective market regulation', 
in Niamh N Shuibne (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward Elgar 2006) 210, 
232; Jan Komárek, 'In the Court(s) we trust? On the need for hierarchy and 
differentiation in the preliminary ruling procedure' (2007) 32 European Law Review 
467; Tridimas (n 6) 754; De la Mare and Donnelly (n 6) 391. 
174 Case C-137/09 Josemans EU:C:2010:774. 
175 Case C-153/14 K. and A. EU:C:2015:453. 
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In the exceptional case that the CJEU does not answer the question, courts 
feel sometimes compelled to send the question back again. The Tribunal 
considered this option after the CJEU judgment in Akdas in 2011 concerning 
the exportability of social security allowances for migrant workers from 
Turkey, because the ruling was unclear in several respects.176 It was eventually 
decided not to resubmit the same case, but the Tribunal asked new questions 
about the same issue in DemirciI, where the Turkish workers had, unlike in 
Akdas, acquired the Dutch nationality.177 In addition, judges also considered 
it bothersome when the CJEU offers the impression that it does not take 
certain issues that are considered to be important in the Netherlands 
seriously.178 The same holds true for the CJEU going into another direction 
than anticipated by the referring court. This in itself is not a problem but can 
become one if the CJEU ignores the reasoning or the suggested answer of the 
referring court and/or does not provide sufficient arguments for this different 
interpretation. The only case that falls into this category is Unal about the 
withdrawal of the residence permit of a Turkish worker with retroactive 
effect.179 
3. Judges' (Dis)Satisfaction with their Interaction with the CJEU 
In addition to criticising particular CJEU judgments, some judges were also 
critical about the CJEU more generally and noted the absence of a genuine 
dialogue with the CJEU.180 Some judges observed in this context that the 
CJEU sometimes presents itself as a 'know-it-all' who is only communicating 
                                                 
176 Case C-485/07 Akdas EU:C:2011:346. 
177 Case C-171/13 Demirci EU:C:2015:8. 
178 Interviews 10, 12, 89, 91. 
179 In addition, the Council of State explicitly held that there was no fraud, but that did 
not prevent the CJEU from dealing with this matter. Case C-187/10 Unal 
EU:C:2011:623, paras. 45-48. 
180 Several judges spoke about a 'black box' and the fact that the referring court does not 
play a role in the period of 1.5 years during which the case is considered by the CJEU, 
because it can, for example, not express its opinion on the submissions of the parties 
and/or interventions of the Commission and Member States. Others who do not 
necessarily have the required expertise are involved to a greater extent. Interviews 
10, 24, 44, 66, 81, 89, 91.  
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in one direction.181 One judge, for example, held that he/she got the feeling 
during a visit in Luxembourg that the attitude of CJEU judges was: 'you come 
to us, we determine the rules'.182 Another judge noted the defensive reaction 
of CJEU judges when he/she raised shortcomings in the CJEU's case law.183 
Other judges mentioned an ivory tower mentality and even wondered 
whether CJEU judges are sufficiently in touch with the society at large. This 
was because the CJEU, in the national judges' view, paid insufficient 
attention to societal concerns and questions related to the feasibility of the 
implementation of CJEU judgments, especially in the area of migration.184 
Some judges also pointed to the translation of CJEU judgments in Dutch that 
they considered not always suitable because this is primarily carried out by 
Flemish professional translators.185  
The earlier mentioned difference between career judges and judges with an 
academic, governmental or EU law background also plays a role with respect 
to the perception of the (interaction with the) CJEU. More EU-oriented 
judges have a relatively better understanding of the difficult legal and political 
context that the CJEU is working in and the fact that it has to take into 
account 28 different legal systems. They are also more aware of the fact that 
the CJEU has considerably reduced the average time to decide on the 
preliminary references in the last twenty years.186 Some noted that colleagues 
with less direct EU-law experience complain more frequently about the long 
delay. 187 In addition, those who are less enthusiastic about referring are more 
critical about the CJEU judgments; either the CJEU limits the room for 
                                                 
181 Interviews 18, 44, 89.  
182 Interviews 44. 
183 Interviews 12. 
184 Interviews 72, 89. 
185 Interviews 24, 43, 81, 89. One example outside the field of migration is the social 
security case Franzen where the reference to 'onvermindend' ('leaving aside') should 
have been 'met uitzondering van' ('with the exception of') in the following statement: 
'Consequently, leaving aside the exclusion provided for in Article 6a(b) of the AKW 
and the AOW, which aims to transpose the single State principle into national 
legislation, the mere fact of residence in the Netherlands is sufficient for entitlement 
to child benefits.' Case C-382/13 Franzen EU:C:2015:261. 
186 Interviews 18, 39, 43, 44, 91. 
187 Interviews 10, 89. 
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manoeuvre of the national judge too much, or it gives too limited direction.188 
The interviewed lower court judges seemed on average more positive about 
the CJEU case law, especially the judge who argued in line with the leapfrog 
argument and clearly perceived the CJEU as an 'ally'. 
4. The Referring Court's Follow-up 
The dissatisfaction with some CJEU judgments and the interaction with the 
CJEU has not affected the national judges' willingness to act upon the 
requested CJEU rulings. Both the legal analysis and the interviews did not 
find support for the earlier mentioned accounts in the literature that national 
courts do not always comply with the CJEU. No follow-up judgments were 
found where the referring court went into a different direction than 
suggested by the CJEU. During the interviews no such instances were 
mentioned, even when the CJEU required courts to alter their jurisprudence. 
In the area of migration and asylum law, courts have generally opted for a 
minimalist reading of CJEU judgments in order to avoid extend the rights of 
the asylum seeker too much.189 
The interviewed judges presented the follow-up to CJEU judgments almost 
as an automatic mechanism even when this meant that they had to change 
their own case law. Interviewed judges considered changing their case law to 
be 'part of the game'. They noted that when the CJEU rules in a certain way, 
'that is just the way it is'. The court is simply obliged to comply with the CJEU 
judgment.190 Judges even considered it more bothersome when the CJEU 
does not give an answer than when the CJEU gives a rap over the knuckles of 
the referring court in a clear and insightful way.191 Examples that were also 
mentioned in interviews include Zh and O, where the CJEU required an 
individual assessment of the risk to public security or national security for 
third country nationals and EU citizens alike, contrary to what the Council 
                                                 
188 Interviewees primarily noted this about other judges. Interviews 10, 39, 44. 
189 One example is the broadly formulated (or vague) judgment of Elgafaji on subsidiary 
asylum protection which was interpreted in a restrictive way by the Council of State 
so that it only applied to a very limited number of situations. Hoevenaars (n 153) 213. 
190 Interviews 18, 72, 89, 91; Sevenster & Wissels (n 33) 93. 
191 Interviews 12, 18, 72, 91. 
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of State initially thought.192 The Council did not show any difficulty in 
implementing this assessment in its follow-up judgment.193 The Council also 
rather easily changed its practice after it was warned by the CJEU in J.N. that 
the Council's more fundamental-rights-friendly approach was not in line with 
the principle of the Reception Conditions Directive that requires a removal 
to be carried out as soon as possible.194 
V. FEEDBACK LOOPS?  
The third question of this article is whether there is a relationship between 
the national judges' perception of their interaction with the CJEU and its 
answers (question 2) and their willingness to refer cases in the future (question 
1). Even though judges were critical about the CJEU or some CJEU 
judgments, this has not affected them to such an extent that they became less 
inclined about referring future cases. This once again shows the pragmatism 
on the part of judges. 
Judges hardly take their previous experiences into account when making the 
calculation of referral, besides for two exceptions showing that they take into 
consideration the expected answer of the CJEU. Firstly, it is not always 
considered useful and time efficient to refer when there is the perception that 
the CJEU merely gives very general, already-known criteria (so-called 
'deference cases'), and/or leaves the assessment entirely to the referring court 
(see section IV.2).177 Secondly, when making a decision (not) to refer, judges 
also consider whether it is possible to clearly explain the legal problem within 
the maximum of 20 pages for the order of reference to judges who are not 
familiar with the legal system.195 It could also happen that the details of the 
                                                 
192 Case C-554/13 Zh. and O. EU:C:2015:377. 
193 Interviews 10, 89. ABRvS 20 November 2015 NL:RVS:2015:3579, para. 7. 
194 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
[2013] OJ L180/96. The Council of State held that the introduction of an asylum 
application by a person who is subject to a return decision automatically causes all 
return decisions that may previously have been adopted in the context of that 
procedure to lapse. Case C-601/15 PPU J.N. EU:C:2016:84, paras. 75-76; ABRvS 8 
April 2016 NL:RVS:2016:959, para. 3.2. 
195 Interviews 10, 18. 
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Dutch legal system are lost in translation to French, the working language of 
the CJEU.196 These considerations played a role in the earlier discussed cases 
about the intensity of judicial review of the administration's assessment of 
the credibility of the asylum claim.197 The idea was that it would be difficult 
to have the CJEU rule on this issue related to a matter of principle, namely 
the relationship between the judiciary and the administration. Additionally, 
interviewees considered that there are notable differences in opinions as to 
the intensity of review within the Netherlands, let alone in the EU with 28 
different legal systems. Likewise, a lower court judge argued that a reference 
to the CJEU was in principle possible in a case in which an asylum seeker from 
Afghanistan sought subsidiary protection on the basis of art. 15, sub c, of the 
Qualification Directive because of a serious and individual threat in 
Afghanistan 'by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict'.198 The judge had to grapple with the 
question about the required level of violence necessary to establish such 
protection. He/she considered, however, that this question does not lend 
itself to be referred to the CJEU because it would be nearly impossible for the 
CJEU to come up with concrete and helpful guidelines.199 The expectation 
was that a referral would only lead to a deference case not worth the burden 
of the delay in this case. 
This relatively short explorative analysis of the third question on feedback 
loops raises several questions that would be worth exploring in further 
research. One pertinent question is, for example, to what extent one can 
speak of feedback loops with respect to the great majority of judges that have 
never referred or referred only once or twice? One might also wonder, do 
feedback loops play a more important role in EU Member States in which 
courts, and especially constitutional courts, tend to be more critical of the 
                                                 
196 Interview 10. 
197 Interviews 10, 18.  
198 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted [2011] OJ L337/9. 
199 Rb. 3 March 2017 NL:RBDHA:2017:3443, para. 5; Rb. 16 May 2017 
NL:RBDHA:2017:5164. 
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CJEU and CJEU judgments? In addition, which factors affect feedback loops 
more: primarily CJEU related factors (question 2) or the motives and attitude 
of judges towards referral (question 1)? It could be that judges and courts that 
have been more critical towards the CJEU and EU law from the outset also 
perceive the CJEU in a more critical way than Dutch courts and judges do. 
The implication of this is while looking at roughly the same glass, more 
critical courts will describe the glass as half empty, while more positive courts 
will perceive the glass as half full. 
Answering these questions requires a broader comparative research project 
on a considerable number of EU Member States, possibly also examining the 
interaction between CJEU and national courts over a longer period of time. 
If a great variance in the prevalence of feedback loops across EU Member 
States is found this could perhaps mean that the (prefixed) attitudes of judges 
are more important than CJEU related factors. It might even be so that those 
attitudes are hardly affected by the way in which the CJEU operates and 
handles requests for preliminary rulings. This also implies that the CJEU has 
limited control over and possibilities to change the way in which national 
courts engage with it. In contrast, if CJEU related factors matter more, this 
could mean that the CJEU can better control and change its perception by 
national courts. This also suggests that it is worthwhile exploring whether 
and how the preliminary ruling procedure needs to be reformed to ensure 
continuing engagement of national courts.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article examined two aspects of the referral procedure: the motives to 
refer and the national judges' perception of the CJEU judgments, and their 
ability to solve the national dispute on the basis of the CJEU judgments. 
With respect to the motives to refer, this article examined several theoretical 
assumptions and empirical claims put forward in the existing literature (see 
Table 9 for an overview). This article showed that judges mainly operate in a 
pragmatic way and predominantly include pragmatic and practical 
considerations in their decision (not) to refer, such as the consequences of 
referring in terms of delays or the importance of the issue at stake. Only a 
limited number of references were made by lower asylum courts, to 'leapfrog' 
the national judicial hierarchy and challenge the more restrictive approach of 
152 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
the supreme administrative courts. Most lower court judges do not support 
the leapfrog argument. Even less cases were referred to get an authoritative 
pronouncement ('sword') on the existence of a breach of EU law by a national 
measure that would subsequently compel the government to change 
legislation. 
Table 9: Overview of findings with respect to motives (not) to refer 
Motives (not) to refer Prevalence 
(Absent, very low, low, moderate, 
high) 
Politico-strategic reasons Low 
Judicial empowerment ('sword') Low (in some referred cases) 
Sustained resistance ('shield') Absent 
Bureaucratic politics 
('leapfrog') 
Moderate (in some referred cases) 
Non-strategic reasons High 
Legal formalism 
(Compliance pull) 
Very low 
Pragmatism High (in all cases, both referred and 
non-referred) 
Personal/ psychological  
 
High  
 
Institutional  Moderate 
Request of the parties Low (in some referred cases) 
 
As to the second follow-up question, this study shows that the referring court 
implements the requested CJEU judgment fully and automatically. This is 
the case despite the fact that most interviewed judges were not necessarily 
satisfied with all CJEU judgments, the procedure before, or the dialogue with 
the CJEU. The judges' own personal background and institutional position 
also plays an important role in their perception of the CJEU's case law. 
National court judges seem to like strong guidance by the CJEU providing 
clear solutions for the case at hand. This finding contrasts with prevailing 
assumptions about the relationship between CJEU and national courts that 
consist in criticising 'interventionist' CJEU judgments. With respect to the 
third question about feedback loops, this study demonstrates that the 
willingness of judges to refer is not affected by their previous experiences and 
dissatisfaction. The national judges' responses to these two questions once 
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more bear witness to their pragmatic attitude towards the preliminary 
reference procedure. 
In sum, the interaction between the CJEU and Dutch courts in the field of 
migration does not give rise to concerns about the functioning of the 
preliminary ruling procedure. What does this finding tell us about the 
broader picture? More specifically, is there cause for concern given the 
allegedly growing number of integration-sceptical national judgments as 
mentioned in the introduction? Even though the scope of this article is 
limited, focusing on Dutch migration cases for a limited period of time, it is 
still possible to offer some meaningful reflections. It is safe to say that the 
literature tends to overemphasise a few high profile cases over the large 
majority of 'often extremely boring' rulings which are neatly implemented.200 
The procedure functions well in the great majority of cases.201 This also 
suggests that the growing pessimism in the literature could be the result of 
the fact that there are more high profile CJEU judgments which are 
extensively discussed and criticised in the popular press and in the academic 
literature. The seemingly growing criticism is also a natural development that 
could simply be the result of the growing competences of the EU in fields of 
law, which have traditionally been the sole domain of EU Member States, 
such as criminal law. In addition, the legally binding effect of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in 2009 also means that the CJEU is operating in an 
area that has long been dominated by generally more EU sceptic 
constitutional courts. These two developments have consequently stirred 
those constitutional courts into action, which is not necessarily a positive 
sign of their willingness to engage with EU law. Referring to the CJEU is also 
a way for such courts to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the CJEU. 
This is a source of concern that should be examined at greater depth, also in 
the light of the unresolved questions formulated earlier in relation to the 
feedback loops. At the same time, we should not forget that 'hard cases', such 
as Ajos, Gauweiler or Taricco receive a disproportionate amount of attention, 
                                                 
200 De Werd (n 5) 156. 
201 This was also the outcome of the ACA Europe Seminar on the preliminary ruling 
procedure in The Hague on 7 November 2016. See www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/ 
en/seminars/511-seminar-in-the-hague-on-7-november-2016, last accessed 31 July 
2018. 
154 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
often to the detriment of the great majority of cases in which the preliminary 
ruling procedure functions well.
